The critical timeframe between the bombing of Hiroshima and the surrender of Japan has been largely ignored by historians. Sadao Asada’s essay, The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender – A Reconsideration is a well-reasoned, critical exploration of the true factors which led to Japan’s surrender to the allies in August, 1945.

Asada is a highly-respected Japanese historian, and he is recognized as the preeminent scholar regarding the Japanese surrender. In the late 1990s, Asada was able to thoroughly review a newly-released cache of Japanese military documents from World War II which had previously been unavailable -or indeed, unknown – to western researchers. He eventually published his findings in the Pacific Historical Review in November 1998.

Asada effectively demolishes two of the atomic revisionists’ favorite claims. The first is that the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan and the subsequent invasion of Manchuria – not the bomb – was the trigger for the Japanese surrender. The second claim is that the Japanese surrender could have come as early as June 1945 if the United States had explicitly guaranteed the continuation of the emperor’s reign as constitutional monarch following Japan’s defeat.

The Soviet invasion “gave them – the Japanese military – an indirect shock, whereas the use of the atomic bomb on their homeland gave them the direct threat of the atomic extinction of the Japanese people.” As for guaranteeing the emperor’s status this was far from the only hurdle to overcome.

When faced with the possibility of surrender, the Japanese Army under Amani came up with three totally unreasonable demands: that there shall be no foreign occupation of Japan, no war crimes trials, and no forcible disarmament of the military. Amani wrongly assumed that Hiroshima was the only atomic weapon available to the Americans, and he was still preparing for a brutal ground war in defense of the Home Islands.

Asada makes it very clear that it wasn’t until the reality of the second atomic attack on Nagasaki finally sank in that the idea of surrender became an acceptable military option to the majority in the Supreme Council. Nagasaki was the turning point which finally broke the hopelessly deadlocked council, and it forced the hardline military leaders to concede to the demands of the Peace Party. Some members of the council were still willing to fight until death if necessary, primarily Minister of the Army Amani and Admiral Toyoda of the Navy. These two could not accept defeat in any context, and they refused to discuss the matter. Unable to accept the terms of surrender, they followed the ancient Samurai tradition and committed hara-kiri – ritual suicide – rather than face defeat.

The actions of the kamikazes in the Pacific war and followers of the odious Samurai ‘Bushido’ philosophy of absolute loyalty to the emperor demonstrated the lengths to which the Japanese would go to in order to avoid surrender. The most radical military leaders (Amani, Toyoda, etc.), following the Bushido code mandated that every citizen – soldiers and civilians alike – should die fighting the enemy. This led the Allied leaders to believe that a land invasion of Japan would involve massive casualties on both sides.

Truman had warned the Japanese in his famous speech that: “If they do not now accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the likes of which has never been seen on this earth.” The bombing of Hiroshima had the intended effect, pushing the Supreme Council for the Direction of War to consider surrender and to take a renewed look at the Potsdam Declaration – but the various factions within the kokutai were deadlocked on a resolution. Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro was becoming desperate. It was only when news of the destruction at Nagasaki reached the Council’s chambers proving that the atomic bomb was not a one-off  that he finally prevailed upon the emperor to secure a surrender agreement.

Yet not even the bombing of Nagasaki could convince some obstinate military hardliners who, when faced with Japan’s complete annihilation, still clung to their fanaticism and pushed for continuation of the war. As a result, the stalemate within the cabinet persisted, even when the emperor’s support for accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration became known. Finally, on the morning of August 10, Hirohito gave his ‘sacred order.’ Speaking before his cabinet, the emperor declared that “if we let matters stand and do not act, the Japanese race will perish and I would be unable to protect my subjects.” The debate continued within the council however. Amani’s associates found out about the emperor’s pre-recorded surrender message and they tried to destroy the tape before it could be aired on national radio. Luckily, one of Hirohito’s staff was smart enough to hide it in the women’s sanctuary – a place where no military officer would dare tread.

The previous day, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce Ishiguro Tadaatsu came up with a brilliant – if slightly twisted – argument that would appease the militarists and allow them to save face in the humiliation of defeat: Japan had not been beaten on the battlefield; she was simply overwhelmed by American scientific prowess. Japan had lost a “scientific war.” In essence, as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido Kiochi later said: “If military leaders could convince themselves that they were defeated by the power of science, but not because of (a) lack of spiritual power or strategic errors, this could save their face to some extent.”

‘Face-saving’ is an important facet of Japanese culture. By accepting the allies’ terms for surrender, the military needed an excuse to justify their humiliating defeat in order to collectively save face; otherwise they would have fought to the last man. This ‘face-saving’ rationale allowed the military leaders to avoid blame for any perceived incompetence in fighting the war. The many questions surrounding Japan’s failed attempt at empire building would never need to be answered by the perpetrators.

The atomic bombings were viewed by some insiders – Kido and Navy Minister Yoni in particular – as “gifts from Heaven.” This is a strange turn of phrase indeed, considering the horrific destruction caused by the attacks. But Kido frames his argument in the context of a profound “psychological shock” which finally helped to break the bitter stalemate in the council and gave the upper hand to the Peace Party. Yoni specifically referred to the combination of both the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war as “gifts from Heaven” for this reason.

This rationale makes sense on many levels. The Japanese military was able to save face by convincing itself they had not been defeated in battle. They were beaten instead ‘by science’ in a kind of military ‘force majeure’ (“greater force”).

The ‘twin shocks’ of the atomic attacks and the Soviet declaration of war are what finally tipped the scales in favor of a negotiated peace. This line of reasoning also assured the continued survival of Japanese society. What remained of Japan’s infrastructure could be spared total annihilation, and there would still be something left on which to rebuild the Japanese economy. History has proven this strategy to be the correct one.

Hirohito was ultimately forced to agree to the conditions proscribed in the Potsdam Declaration, but only if he could retain his position as representative of the Japanese people. Truman and Stimson eventually accepted Japan’s surrender terms with this one concession, concluding that His Highness would be of more use to the allies alive than dead. Emperor Hirohito’s survival would prove to be critical in convincing the Japanese people to lay down their arms and avoid the predicted bloodbath if the land invasion went through as planned. This way, more fighting could be avoided and the war could end quickly.

A speedy resolution to the hostilities would also give the Soviet Union (which had only just declared war on Japan) less bargaining power in the region, and deny her more territory. Eventually, the Allies agreed to maintain the status of the emperor on the condition that he cooperate with the occupying forces following the surrender, and assist in the formation of the future government.

Most Japanese historians now concede that technically Japan was militarily defeated by August of 1945, if not before. But they have generally been ambivalent about the definition between the literal terms ‘defeat’ and ‘surrender.’ There is a subtle distinction.

‘Defeat’ is a military metaphor which is also used in sports, meaning: “failure to win (a competition) or to succeed in doing something.” Defeat is not the same thing as surrender. ‘Surrender’ means to accept defeat: “to stop fighting and admit defeat”; or the “act of saying officially that you have been defeated and will stop fighting.” Neither of these terms were totally acceptable to the militarists in the council, although ‘defeat’ is clearly better than ‘surrender.’ And in fact the emperor never mentions the words ‘defeat’ or ‘surrender’ in his famous address to the nation on August 15, 1945. Hirohito only said that “The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives.”

In this way, the emperor was also able to subtly encourage the myth of Japanese “victimization” by portraying the victims of this ‘most cruel bomb’ as martyrs – and by extension, the entire nation of Japan – while glossing over the actual motives for the atomic bombings. Because of this, it has been difficult for Japanese historians to discuss the true conditions leading up to the surrender in August of 1945 in the proper context. Japan had been terrorizing its neighbors since 1931 when the fascist military leaders began their brutal crusade to expand the empire in the Pacific Rim. They invaded Manchuria on September 19, 1931, and the puppet state called Manchukuo was created. The occupation lasted until the end of World War II. Then came the pyrrhic victory at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 – but it was all downhill from there for the empire.

Yet all of this was swept under the rug by Japan’s leaders at the time. It was so much easier to endorse the culture of victimization so pervasive among Japanese historians until Sadao Asada came along to set the record straight.