Despite all that we’ve learned about the pre-WW II environment in Britain, it is still hard to make a reasonable case for appeasement without the benefit of hindsight. Some historians feel that appeasement was a direct cause of World War II because it allowed Hitler to grow in power and confidence. This is simply not the case.

First and foremost, the horrifying specter of World War I was still a major consideration in most English homes in the late 1930s. Nearly every family was affected by “the war to end all wars” and most had lost at least one family member. Memories of the devastation from that conflict were still fresh in people’s minds. If a small group of Tories hadn’t lobbied for Chamberlin’s removal against incredible odds and popular opinion, Churchill would not have been able to stage a coup.

Even though some of the elite in Britain and France may have been aware of Hitler’s true intentions, they were more concerned with the spread of Communism than they were about the Nazis. Some business leaders also had vested commercial interests in keeping the Reich strong. Several politicians quietly agreed with Hitler that the Treaty of Versailles was unacceptable to Germany. There was a widespread belief that the treaty was too harsh.

A more compelling argument for appeasement would be that by pacifying Hitler in the short term, Chamberlain was playing for time to delay the war until the country had a chance to rearm. If the country had gone to war in 1938 instead of in 1940, it would most likely have been defeated.

When Germany began rearming in 1934, many politicians in Britain felt that Germany had a right to do so in order to protect its national interests. Some argued that a stronger Germany would prevent the spread of Communism in Western Europe.

In May of 1937, Neville Chamberlain became Prime minister of Britain. With the possibility of another terrible war looming on the horizon, he set in place a measured, reasonable policy of appeasement toward Germany. Chamberlain may have had a nasty streak of political vindictiveness, but he was certainly not a dictator. He didn’t have the power to start a war whenever he pleased. He would not go to war without the full support of the people, and until 1939 most people wanted peace; almost at any price.

Peace was in Britain’s best interests. The country’s economy was in a shambles and it was clearly not ready militarily. A cautious policy of appeasement was a perfectly reasonable response to Hitler’s blatant acts of aggression.

Today, appeasement means ‘surrender’ or ‘cowardice’ rather than the noble ideal of sticking to one’s own principles in a spirit of compromise and understanding. That is the role appeasement is meant to play. It should not be considered a bad position. It is not a position of weakness – it is a position of strength. Appeasement gave the British time to prepare for war.

There was a fine line between the appeasers and the war-mongers. It has been argued that Chamberlin and the Tory majority had little understanding of the danger Hitler posed to Britain at the time. The upper classes were rife with Nazi sympathizers, and the population was ill-informed of the events boiling over in Europe. Appeasement was simply a continuation of Britain’s policy of keeping the peace.

Until the Munich Agreement of 1938, appeasement was a positive term implying reasonableness and the justness of one’s actions. The agreement was signed on September 30, 1938, between Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. The agreement allowed Hitler to peacefully annex large parts of Czechoslovakia inhabited by ethnic Germans. It is too easy to look back now and agree with the “verdict of history,” but a reasoned policy of appeasement was the only sensible way to avoid another pointless conflagration like World War I – or worse. Chamberlain simply wanted to see if peace was possible.

Chamberlain concluded that Czechoslovakia was expendable at the Munich meeting. The country was of little importance to British interests. It was not worth the effort to fight Hitler’s army. Chamberlain was also understandably reluctant to seek any kind of military alliance with the Soviet Union – he distrusted Stalin personally and was ideologically opposed to communism. In the minds of many, a strong Germany would act as a bulwark against the plague of communism. Nazi Germany would prevent expansion by the communists.

Memories of World War I were still fresh in everyone’s mind in the late 30s. The British people were desperate to avoid another conflagration. What choice did Chamberlain really have in 1938? His options were limited to either accepting Hitler’s demands or go to war alone. In 1938 Britain had no allies – no other countries would join Britain to fight the Nazis. Britain was in no position to make demands on Germany.

It can be argued that the delay in hostilities engineered by Chamberlain at Munich allowed time for the country’s military and air power to be strengthened. Britain was forced into the role of defending democracy in Europe. Chamberlain pursued a policy of appeasement and containment towards Hitler while at the same time increasing the strength of Britain’s armed forces.

There were important strategic reasons for Britain’s policy of Appeasement. Any reallocation of commercial production to military armaments would mean an increase in inflation and the trade unions’ demands for wage hikes for workers. An increase in wages demanded by the trade unions was a major consideration to the ruling class. Chamberlain tried to institute a stable financial plan. More than anything, Chamberlain’s rhetorical failings did him in.

Today, Winston Churchill is recognized as one of history’s greatest communicators. While Churchill and his supporters were busy condemning Britain’s foreign policy in the House of Commons, the economic problems still remained. Rearmament meant that the production of commercial non-military goods and services would be seriously curtailed. Despite all of the challenges he faced, Chamberlain was fully committed to “Peace in our Time.” That was the only moral choice. It was not a policy of “peace at any price,” either: it was a strategic, long-term policy of maintaining peace with an “iron fist inside a velvet glove.” Britain began an accelerated program of re-industrialization – as a deterrent to any further German aggression.

Neville Chamberlain, the “master of the House of Commons” knew that war would be extremely unpopular with the public and that any war of attrition with Germany would mean increased power for trade unions and Labor.

It wasn’t until the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 that Chamberlain’s hand was forced. Britain desperately needed jobs, not another world war. The average citizen was more concerned about avoiding an economic disaster at home. Britain was in no position to rearm to the extent necessary to defeat Hitler. Britain could not and should not have to act as the world’s policeman. The empire was winding down. Britain was incapable of defeating the Nazis without the help of bigger and more powerful nations such as the United States and the Soviet Union. Chamberlain knew this.

The appeasers may have missed the perfect opportunity to ally with the Soviets, but there is no question that Chamberlain had sound reasons to believe that appeasement was the best Britain could hope for under the circumstances. War must always be a last resort.