The government of Japan had many reasons to resist the Potsdam Declaration initially. As discussed in J. Samuel Walker’s Prompt & Utter Destruction, The Declaration – also known as the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender – was a document outlining the conditions for Japan’s surrender in World War II issued by the US, Great Britain and China on July 26th, 1945. The Soviet Union was represented at the Potsdam Conference in Germany by Joseph Stalin, but he did not sign the Declaration.

The Declaration called for the surrender of the Empire of Japan. The ultimatum was agreed upon by the attendees at the Potsdam Conference. It was essentially a mandate which threatened that if Japan did not surrender immediately it would face “prompt and utter destruction,” but the nature of the threat was not specific. This presented the Japanese Supreme Council for the Direction of the War with a serious dilemma. Factions within the Japanese military establishment were ready to end the war as long as the Emperor was retained, but others were prepared to fight to the death. The Potsdam Declaration was ambiguous regarding the status of the Emperor, but it was conciliatory in several other respects: it included guarantees that ordinary Japanese soldiers would not be interned indefinitely, that its people would not be enslaved, and that Japanese industry and society would not be destroyed. It assigned guilt for the war primarily to “self-willed militaristic advisers” rather than the Emperor.

While it fell short of guaranteeing the status of Emperor Hirohito’s relevance in any postwar government, this assignment of war guilt at least suggested the possibility that His Highness could be retained in some fashion and not tried as a war criminal. The Supreme Council stood firm in public, but the allies were unaware of the major power struggles being waged behind the scenes. Understandably, there were deep divisions among the various military factions regarding the continuation of the war. Premier Suzuki and Foreign Minister Togo saw promise in the Potsdam Declaration, but the Supreme Council saw it as an insult to the people of Japan, and therefore totally unacceptable.

Certainly, the Premier gave no public indication that the Potsdam Declaration was under consideration, even after the text was broadcast over Japanese radio. In his infamous press conference responding to the Declaration, Suzuki said, “I believe the Joint Proclamation by the three countries is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the Government, it does not find any important value in it and there is no other recourse but to ignore it entirely and resolutely fight for the successful conclusion of the war.”

Suzuki’s choice of words has been the subject of much historical debate. The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the FCC translated the Japanese term mokusatsu in his statement as meaning, “to ignore.” But mokusatsu can also be translated as: “treat with silent contempt” or “to kill with silence.” Suzuki later explained that he simply meant to convey the meaning of the English expression, “no comment.”

The Cairo Declaration, signed by the allied powers back on November 27th, 1943 – while Roosevelt was still US President – stated the allies’ intention to continue deploying military force against Japan until they agreed to unconditional surrender. Soviet leader Stalin refused to attend the Cairo conference leading up to the Declaration because Chiang Kai-shek, representing the Republic of China, was there. This would lead to future tensions between the two nations; but at the time (1943) the USSR was not at war with Japan – in fact, the two countries had signed a non-aggression pact in 1941.

When Truman arrived in Potsdam he was initially very excited and enthusiastic to include the Soviets in the future war plans, but by the time the conference ended on August 9th, the world had profoundly changed – along with his views. The first test of ‘S1’ (code name for the bomb) was supposed to occur prior to the meeting of the allied powers in Potsdam, but it was delayed due to technical problems. There were no guarantees of the bomb’s success in any case, so when Stalin confirmed that the Soviet Union would declare war against Japan in mid-August 1945, Truman was overjoyed.

Once news of the successful atomic test in Alamogordo on July 16th reached the conference a few days later, however, President Truman, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes began to share a different view. The Soviets were increasingly seen as a threat to US hegemony in the region, and America’s nuclear monopoly vastly changed the dynamics of the relationship between the two superpowers.

The Soviet Union’s role became much less important to overall victory against Japan – indeed, it was no longer even considered “essential or desirable.” The American negotiators began to disengage from the Russians and Truman started challenging Stalin on his imperialistic ambitions. In the end, Joseph Stalin did not sign the Potsdam Declaration, even though many of its protocols were later adopted, primarily regarding Eastern Europe. Stalin was extremely upset when Truman informed him of the successful test at Trinity, although he feigned indifference at the time.

The Potsdam Declaration has been criticized for failing to include the Soviet Union, for not making an explicit threat to use atomic weapons against the Japanese people, and for not clearly stating that the Allies were prepared to allow the Emperor to remain as a constitutional monarch. If these provisions to the Declaration had been included, they arguably would have led to its immediate acceptance by the Japanese authorities. But since no one outside of a small circle of insiders even understood the implications of the new weapon technology, specific mention of the atomic bomb might have been interpreted as an empty threat. Stalin correctly concluded that the bomb could be used against him politically, if not literally. As soon as he found out about the destruction of Hiroshima, he ordered the invasion of Manchuria on August 8th.

On August 9th, 1945, the Japanese government, reeling from the bombing of Hiroshima on the sixth and the declaration of war by the Soviet Union the previous day, convened the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War to discuss final preparations for ending the conflict and to debate the merits of the Potsdam Declaration. Premier Suzuki argued that the Council had no choice but to surrender, with the sole condition being that the Emperor should retain his throne. The military chiefs baulked at this suggestion and came up with three further conditions. Besides the preservation of the Imperial Institution, they wanted the Allies to “greatly restrict or forego entirely” the occupation of their country after the war; allow the Japanese to conduct their own war trials; and finally, to permit the military to “disarm themselves.”

These conditions would clearly have been totally unacceptable to the US and its allies, and foreign Minister Togo accurately advised the Council of this. The debate raged on for hours with the members hopelessly deadlocked, until the shocking news of the tragedy in Nagasaki reached the chambers. At that point, it became clear that the naysayers had been wrong – the attacks on Hiroshima and (now) Nagasaki proved that the United States had developed atomic weapons, and that they could produce more than one of them. This revelation created panic among the peace faction who feared that more of these terrible weapons would be used against the Japanese people if they did not acquiesce.

It took the personal intervention of Emperor Hirohito – an extreme departure from normal procedure – before the Council relented and agreed to issue a conciliatory statement to the allies. The following day, the Japanese sent a diplomatic cable through the Swiss embassy to the US, accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, “with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign Ruler.”

After still more heated debate on both sides, this was the only one of the four supplementary conditions to the Potsdam Declaration which was eventually – and very grudgingly – honored by the United States. All things considered, the Potsdam Declaration was a pretty good deal for the Japanese. This fact still did not prevent an attempted military coup by the diehards in the Council – who later committed Harakiri – but once the Emperor made his famous radio address to the Japanese people on August 14th, there was no point in any further resistance.